JOSHUA OCHEJA contends that the military needs the support of the people to win the war
In January of 2015, Baga, a commercial town in the Kukawa Local Government Area of Borno State, was a centre of attention. Boko Haram overran the town and its environs in what could arguably pass for one of the insurgent group’s deadliest attacks. The number of civilian casualties was huge. The military also had a fair share in the carnage, as the then headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the town was badly hit. Something went unnoticed. That was one of the instances where the people became targets of the Boko Haram group. Why did Boko Haram attack the people of Baga, who were obviously their kinsmen? This is a million-dollar question.
I attended a conference organised by the Civil-Military Relations branch of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) with the theme “Leveraging Civil-Military Relations for Enhanced Operational Efficiency.” The highlight of the conference focused on winning the hearts and minds of people in conflict areas. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sunday Kelvin Aneke, made an instructive remark. He said, “Civil trust, not just firepower, now defines military success.” I was impressed with his stance and reflected on how the military can gain the trust of the people in the fight against Boko Haram. During the discussions, I identified the British Malayan Emergency of 1948 as a case study of how the military can win the trust of the people.
The “British Malayan Emergency of 1948–1960” was identified with the slogan of “Victory did not lie in pouring more troops into the battlefield, but in the hearts and minds of the people.” It was a battle between the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), a guerrilla unit of communist pro-independence fighters, and the military forces of the Federation of Malaya and the Commonwealth (British Empire). The turning point, as recorded historically, was between 1952 and 1954, following the assassination of the British High commissioner in Malaya, Henry Gurney, in 1951. General Gerald Templer was appointed as British High Commissioner in 1952 to take over the operation, and he famously stated, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people.”
The realisation was that to defeat the insurgent group, the people’s buy-in was critical, and it built a counterinsurgency military doctrine around it. The British forces subsequently built schools and provided electricity and clean water to the people. According to historical accounts, by providing a better quality of life, the British troops turned the civilians into “informants”, and it changed the war trajectory. This example shares a semblance with the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast. It can be argued that the civil-military relations doctrine embraced by the military draws inspiration from the British Malayan Emergency model.
For a long time, the military fought a battle against the people unknowingly, and it proved costly. There were several gaps in the interpretation of the mission of the military by the local population in their area. The military appeared like invaders to the people, and their operations were constantly frustrated. The military could not differentiate between the “good guys and the bad guys” because they spoke the same language. This is called the identity crisis in asymmetric warfare. This gap resulted in some unpleasant situations as a result of the deployment of indiscriminate force by the military by treating the entire communities as suspects. Have we wondered why at some point, close to 20 local government areas in Borno and Yobe States were under the control of Boko Haram insurgents?
This was during the reign of Abubakar Shekau as the leader of the Boko Haram group. But, along the line, there was a twist. A splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), was formed by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, one of the sons of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram. ISWAP presented itself as an alternative to the state, particularly in remote areas. The group constructed generator-powered boreholes, provided boats and canoes for riverine communities, constructed latrines, installed grain-grinding machines for free use by members of communities, and settled disputes through religious courts.
That was their bait to the people to support them, and the people did. Even though Boko Haram was a ragtag group at the time, they succeeded because of the support they received from the people. This made the military disadvantaged and one of the reasons why the insurgency stretched to date. This was corroborated by several submissions at the NAF-CMR conference. But of course, with recommendations on the way forward towards winning the hearts and minds of the people. A major highlight in this regard was the example of the Chief of Air Staff Special Intervention Projects that supports building schools and providing amenities and a host of other humanitarian activities in communities to foster cooperation with the people against non-state actors perpetuating violence.
The NAF-CMR Conference was strategic in my reckoning. One of the guest speakers, Dr Okey Ikechukwu, a professor of strategic management and human capital development, delivered a paper on “Civil-Military Relations and Perception Management: NAF in Focus”. He argued that perception in the minds of the people is critical to winning the war against insurgency and other acts of criminality. Air Vice Marshal JD Gwani (Rtd) was very practical in his presentation as a former commander in kinetic and non-kinetic operations. His paper, “Leveraging Civil-Military Relations for Enhanced Operational Efficiency”, was the crux of the conference. He used the analogy of the distance between the “pilot in the air and the peasant on the ground”. He emphasised that the Nigerian Air Force must not be perceived by the people as a source of “fire from the sky” but a “provider of life for people on the ground”. This indeed resonates with the “Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan to enhance the efforts of the Nigerian Air Force at mitigating and responding to civilian harm resulting from air operations.” I gathered that the Nigerian Air Force through the CMR Branch has lived up to expectations in this regard with examples in Sokoto, Zamfara and Rivers State.
Air Vice Marshal Edward Gabkwet, the Chief of Civil-Military Relations was very clear about the CMR intentions of the Nigerian Air Force. In his remarks, he said the “Nigerian Air Force has repositioned civil–military relations as a core operational tool through sustained community engagement, structured feedback systems, and enhanced strategic communication across operational theatres.”
Interestingly, this was the crux of an article I authored in 2025 titled “Winning a War Beyond Bullets”. I highlighted that the military has traditionally relied on kinetic operations, focusing on physical force and supporting systems. However, in recent times, the military has adopted non-kinetic strategies, prioritising diplomacy and other non-combatant methods that appeal to human sensibilities in its counterinsurgency operations.”
The “Pilot and the Peasant” message is clear. The military can’t win the war without the support of the people. Unless we think otherwise.
Ocheja, PhD, a military historian and creative writer, is an alumnus of the Nigerian Defence Academy
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